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NOTES
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
OF DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
The decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Estin v. Esti . in 1948 and Armstrong v. Armstrong2 in
1956 have added considerable content to the Court's renovated inter-
pretation of the application of the full faith and credit clause to the
field of interstate divorce. Six years before Estin the decision in
Williams v. North Carolina4 had marked the initial phase of the
Court's modernization of the doctrine that had been established since
Haddock v'. Haddock.5 Concepts that had served reasonably well at
the turn of the century were no longer adequate for a mobile, urban-
ized, socially "enlightened" population. Swept away by Williams I
was the anachronistic concept of "matrimonial domicile" and the
patently unrealistic requirement of "fault" as an element of divorce
jurisdiction. The Court's new attitude was to broaden, the scope of
constitutional protection afforded ex parte divorce decrees.0 As a
result of Williams I, a divorce decree obtained in a state in which one
of the spouses was a bona fide domiciliary was valid and entitled to
full faith and credit even though the other spouse was neither per-
sonally served with process nor appeared in the state gfanting the
divorce.
1. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). A companion case, Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 556
(1948), was decided at the same time and on the same principle as the Estin case.
For comment on these cases, see Carey & MacChesney, Divorces by the Consent
of the Parties and Divisible Divorce Decrees, 43 ILL. L. R-v. 608 (1948) ; Morris
Divisible Divorce, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1287 (1951); Paulsen, Support Rights and
an Out-of-State Divorce, 38 MINN. L. REv. 709 (1954); Paulsen, Migratory
Divorce, 24 IND. L.J. 25 (1948). In connection with the Estin case, see also
Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), discussed in Carnahan, What Is Happening
in the Conflict of Laws: Three Supreme Court Cases, 6 VAND. L. REV. 607, 628
(1953).
2. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173 (U.S. April 9, 1956).
3. U.S. CoNST. art IV, § 1 provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Congress has enacted legislation implementing the constitutional provision by
providing that judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States ... as" they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State . . . from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
4. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (hereinafter cited as Williams I).
5. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
6. As used in this discussion, ex parte divorce decrees are those that are
granted to one spouse without personal service upon or appearance by the absent
spouse.
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But the problem was not merely to adjust judicial doctrine to
changing social mores. Since the Supreme Court could act only upon
specific factual situations as they arose, the renovation had to be
piecemeal. The decisions in the few cases that did arise seemed to
create more problems than they solved. The supposedly broad mea-
sure of constitutional protection achieved in Williams I was consider-
ably narrowed by the second Williams case,7 which allowed the court
of the forum (F-2) to re-examine the jurisdictional basis of the di-
vorcing state (F-1) and to refuse recognition to a divorce decree if it
found that the plaintiff had not established a bona fide domicile in
F-1.
The Williams cases were prosecutions under a North Carolina stat-
ute for bigamous cohabitation. While the result of successful prose-
cution in this area is certainly severe, the major social problem in the
field of interstate divorce does not concern criminal prosecution of
an errant spouse. Rather, the controversy has centered upon the
deserted wife, who, as a result of lax divorce laws and the constitu-
tional protection accorded ex parte divorce decrees, may be deprived
not only of conjugal association but also of any claim for support
from her wayward husband without ever having a reasonable oppor-
tunity to have her claim adjudicated on the merits.
To this problem the Estin case provided a partial solution by the
formulation of the doctrine of "divisible divorce.", Thus, a husband
securing an ex parte divorce decree that is entitled to full faith and
credit under the rule of Williams I can remarry and procreate with
impunity; he will not be guilty of bigamy, nor will the children of
such a marriage live under the stigma of illegitimacy. But such a
divorce will not be conclusive of the wife's right to support. The
divorce is therefore "divisible." It is effective for one purpose-ter-
mination of the marital status-but ineffective for another-deter-
mination of the wife's right to support.
The Estin case, however, involved a wife's support rights that had
been adjudicated prior to the husband's ex parte divorce. Will the
theory of the Estin case also apply when (as in the usual case) the
wife's support rights have not been formally adjudicated prior to the
divorce? The recently decided case of Armstrong v. Armstrong in-
volved such a situation, and four Justices expressed the opinion that
i. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (hereinafter cited as
Williams, II). The Williams cases produced a wealth of comment, for the most
part critical. The following articles are particularly noteworthy: Bingham, Song
of Si.,pence, 29 CoRNELL L.Q. 1 (1943); Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Over-
riled?, 18 IND. L.J. 165 (1943); Corwin, Out-HaddockIng Haddock, 93 U. PA. L.
REV. :341 (1945); Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overruled, 52 YALE L.J. 341
(1943); Lorenzen, The Aftermath of Williams v. North Carolina, 1 MIAM L.Q.
1 (1947); Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REV. 930 (1945).
8. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
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the theory of Estin was applicable?9 Justice Minton, writing for the
majority of the Court, however, felt that under the particular facts
of the case no full faith and credit question was presented. 0 Thus, a
definite resolution of this aspect of the divisible divorce doctrine must
await future decisions. Assuming, however, that full faith and credit
does not preclude the wife's alimony action, her more practical (and
frequently more difficult) problem is to discover a remedy under local
law by which she may secure relief.
The purpose of this note is to explore these questions in terms of
the constitutional law established by the Supreme Court and to ex-
amine the conflict of laws rules established in the states, in those
areas in which local law controls.
I
In most of the recent analyses of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the full faith and credit clause in the area of interstate divorce,
the starting points are the famous Williams cases. Justice Douglas'
statement, "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled,"" generally has been
accepted at its face value. Recent developments in' the Court, how-
ever, indicate that some of the pre-Williams cases still may have con-
siderable vitality. For purposes of this note, three cases in particular,
Atherton v. Atherbon,12 Haddock v. Haddock,'13 and Thompson v.
Thompson, 4 require special consideration.
In the Atherton case the parties were married in New York and
subsequently established their domicile in Kentucky. After three
years of residence in Kentucky, marital difficulties developed and
W left H, returning to her parents' home in New York. Some two
years later H obtained a divorce in Kentucky. W was not personally
served with process nor did she appear in the proceedings. Subse-
quently, W brought action in New York for a divorce, custody of their
child, and support for herself and the child. The New York court held
that the Kentucky divorce decree was not entitled to full faith and
credit and granted W the relief sought. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that since the divorce decree was valid in Kentucky it was
also entitled to recognition in New York.'5 The Court, however, spe-
cifically limited the scope of its decision to the situation in which the
divorce was obtained at the "matrimonial domicile," i.e., the state
where the parties last lived together as husband and wife. Thus, it
9. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173, 4175 (U.S. April 9, 1956).
10. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173 (U.S. April 9, 1956). See text supported by notes
41-42 infra.
11. 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
12. 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
13. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
14. 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
15. 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
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was felt that a spouse should be able to terminate effectively the
marital relation at the matrimonial domicile without having to pur-
sue his partner throughout the country.
It is important, however, to note the theory upon which W based
her action in Atherton. The relief she sought was predicated on the
continued existence of the marital relation after the Kentucky divorce.
No contention was made that even if the divorce were valid, W should
still be entitled to support for herself and her child. That such a con-
tention might have met with success was indicated by the Court, for
it cited authorities which recognized the distinction between the ter-
mination of the marital relation and the elimination of the wife's
support rights. 0 Thus, even at this early stage, there was language
which anticipated the divisible divorce doctrine to be formulated later
in the Estin case.
The importance of the concept of "matrimonial domicile" was
further emphasized in the landmark case of Haddock v. Haddock.17
In this case H deserted TV in the matrimonial domicile of New York,
established residence in Connecticut, and there secured an ex parte
divorce. Some eighteen years later TV obtained personal jurisdiction
over H in New York and sued for separation and alimony.18 Evidence
of H's Connecticut divorce secured upon the ground of fraud in the
procurement of the marriage was excluded in the New York courts
and the relief sought by W was granted. On appeal, the Supreme
Court, with four justices dissenting, affirmed, holding that the Con-
necticut divorce was not entitled to full faith and credit. Justice
White's majority opinion was inconsistent and unenlightening. In
addition to limiting Atherton to its precise facts, Haddock established
the element of "fault" as a factor in divorce jurisdiction. It is true,
of course, that whenever a court in F-1 grants a divorce, it is neces-
sarily finding that the spouse obtaining the divorce was not at fault.
But under the Haddock case the finding of fault in F-1 could be re-
litigated by a court in F-2 unless F-1 were the matrimonial domicile.
Thus, if the F-2 court found that the spouse obtaining the divorce
wrongfully deserted the other in the matrimonial domicile, the de-
serter could not take the marital relation with him to the divorcing
state. Since a court in the divorcing state would have neither personal
jurisdiction over the deserted spouse, nor jurisdiction of the res or
16. Id. at 162. Curiously enough, these same authorities that were cited in
A thert,,t, and then apparently forgotten were later used by the concurring
Justice< in A r.Yitrong to bulwark the argument that there should be a distinction
between dissolving the marital relation and terminating W's right to support.
24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173, 4176 n.3 (U.S. April 9, 1956).
17. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
18. There was considerable question in Haddock whether W's claim was
barred by laches. She had taken no action for twenty-six years from the time H
left her. The Court, however, properly ruled that state law was controlling.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/4
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subject matter-the marital relation remaining in the matrimonial
domicile with the deserted spouse-the court would have no "jurisdic-
tion" to render a divorce decree entitled to extrastate recognition
under the Atherton case. 9 Justice Holmes' dissent presented the es-
sential problem of the case precisely: Should the jurisdiction of the
Connecticut court to render an effective divorce decree depend upon
the merits of the case? After answering this question in the negative,
Holmes further contended that the divorce should be recognized under
full faith and credit even though not obtained at the matrimonial
domicile, since the effect of attaching special importance to that con-
cept was to perpetuate a "pure fiction.120
As might be expected, the Haddock case caused no little consterna-
tion.21 The storm of criticism eventually subsided, however, as
gradual adjustment to the new concept was achieved. A fairly well-
defined pattern of decisions emerged. Ex parte divorces obtained in
the matrimonial domicile were entitled to recognition throughout the
country; those obtained elsewhere were of a more precarious nature,
but in most states were recognized under a vaguely defined "public
policy" which accepted the social undesirability of attacking divorces
presumed by the parties to be valid. In retrospect, the decision in the
Haddock case, when viewed in terms of the actual result of the case,
as distinguished from the rationale of fault and matrimonial domicile
in the opinion, seems not nearly so opprobrious. There is certainly
strong justification for making every reasonable attempt to protect
the interest of a deserted spouse and her children against the eco-
nomic and social havoc created when a ne'er-do-well husband attempts
io free himself from all marital obligations by means of a six-weeks'
sojourn in Nevada. Whether this protection, however, was worth the
sacrifice of certainty in marital status caused by Haddock is open to
question.
Between Haddock and Williams I only one other Supreme Court
case relevant to this discussion was decided. That case, Thompson v.
19. See text supported by notes 15-16 supra.
20. 201 U.S. 562, 630 (1906). As Justice Holmes pointed out, the only dis-
tinction between Atherton and Haddock was that the divorce in Atherton had
been rendered at the matrimonial domicile. Moreover, the "fault" analysis of the
majority opinion was itself inconsistent, since the jurisdiction of the matrimonial
domicile was not dependent on the fact of W's desertion, but continued even if H'S
cruelty had driven her outside the state.
21. See, e.g., Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees of Divorce, 19 HARv.
L. REV. 586 (1906); Schofield, The Doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, 1 ILL. L. Rnv.
219 (1906). For further comment on the problems of the Haddock case, see
McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction, 37 YALE L.J. 564
(1928); Parks, Some Problems in Jurisdiction to Divorce, 13 MiNN. L. REV. 525(1929). Not until twenty years later was Professor Beale able to reconcile him-
self with the Haddock case. See Beale, Haddock Revisited, 39 HARV. L. Ruv.
417 (1926).
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Thompson2 2 has proved to be an enigma in the later development of
the divisible divorce doctrine. In the case TV filed an action for sepa-
rate maintenance in the District of Columbia; H evaded service of
process and removed to Virginia, the parties' matrimonial domicile.
In due course he obtained an ex parte divorce in Virginia, which he
then pleaded in bar of TV's action for separate maintenance. H's plea
was sustained by the Supreme Court. Under the rule of the Atherton
case, the court in the matrimonial domicile, in this case Virginia, had
jurisdiction over the marital relation and could adjudicate the rights
of both parties in respect to that relation. The Virginia decree, hav-
ing been based on a finding of W's wrongful desertion, was entitled
to full faith in the District of Columbia. The only further inquiry,
therefore, was to determine whether the divorce would have barred
W's action in Virginia. If so, full faith required that the decree be
given the same effect in the District of Columbia. After examining
Virginia law the court concluded:
[Sjince the courts of Virginia hold upon general principles that
alhmony has its origin in the legal obligation of the husband to
maintain his wife, and that although this is her right she may by
hr conduct forfeit it, and where she is the offender she cannot
have alimony on a divorce decreed in favor of the husband.., it
:. plain that such a decree forecloses any right of the wife to have
alinony or equivalent maintenance from her husband under the
law of Virginia.2
This language, making no distinction between the jurisdictional
requisite necessary to adjudicate marital status and that required to
determine W's support rights, has proved to be a major obstacle to
the later formulation of the doctrine of divisible divorce.24 Apparently,
however, no attempt was made in Thompson to argue that such a dis-
tinction should be recognized. As in Atherton, W's theory was based
on the continued existence of the marital relation. Having found that
the Virginia court had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, the Court
apparently assumed the existence of jurisdiction to sever W's support
rights as a matter of course. The incipient development of the divisi-
ble divorce concept had not yet come to fruition.
Following the Thompson case, the next major developments were
the lVilliams cases.2- These cases have received extensive comment,26
22. 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
23. IJ. at 566.
24. See, e.g., Justice Douglas' attempt to distinguish Thompson in Estin v.
Estin, 384 U.S. 541, 546 n.4 (1948). For extended discussion of the current
validity of Ttiompsozz, see text supported by notes 36-47 infra.
2. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina, 817 U.S. 287 (1942). See also Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945), decided on the same principle as Williams II.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Esenwein anticipated the position on
divisible divorce that he was later to adopt in the Estin case. Id. at 282-83.
26, See note 7 supra.
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and extended discussion in this note of their factual situation, or of
the social and moral problems involved, would serve no useful pur-
pose. The principles of these cases are now fairly well-established
law. It is important, however, to observe the precise limits of the two
cases. As a result of Williams I, a court in a state which is the bona
fide domicile of one of the spouses can render a divorce decree that,
insofar as it affects the marital relation, is entitled to full faith and
credit in every other state. Under Williams II, whether the spouse ob-
taining the divorce was actually domiciled in the divorcing state (F-1)
is open to inquiry in the court of the forum (F-2) as part of the
latter's legitimate determination of the "jurisdiction" of the court
rendering the decree.27 The jurisdictional inquiry in F-2, therefore,
was concerned only with determining whether the petitioner acquired
a bona fide domicile in the state granting the divorce. If he had done
so, further inquiry into the validity of the divorce was precluded by
full faith; if not, the F-2 court could determine for itself whether to
grant the relief sought. No longer was the question of full faith to
turn upon the matrimonial domicile and fault aspects of Haddock.
But it is apparent that Justice Douglas was not strictly accurate in
asserting that the Haddock case was overruled. True, the rationale
of Haddock was inconsistent with the result reached in the first Wil-
liams case. But the Haddock case involved the question of the support
rights of the wife and child, while the Williams case was a criminal
prosecution. Considering the difference in the issues presented in
the two cases, it would seem that their results are not irreconcilable.
In fact, it is submitted that the ultimate result of the Haddock case,
i.e., that W can obtain alimony, would be the same were the case to be
decided today.28 The factor unifying the Haddock and Williams cases
-the concept of divisible divorce-was not to become apparent, how-
ever, until the decision in Estin v. Estin.
In the Estin case, W obtained a separate maintenance decree in New
York, the parties' domicile; the decree provided for monthly payments
by H. Subsequently, H left New York, went to Nevada, and there
procured an ex parte divorce decree. This decree contained no provi-
sion for alimony for W, and H thereupon ceased making the payments
required under the New York decree. W obtained personal service of
process against H in New York and sought judgment for the amounts
27.. Since Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873), it has been
recognized in this country that a judgment is subject to collateral attack in F-2
on the basis of lack of jurisdiction in the court granting the judgment. Like
many another "leading" case, however, Thompson v. Whitman does not actually
stand for the proposition for which it is so frequently cited. See HARPER, TAINTOR,
CARNAHAN & BROWN, CONFLCT OF LAws 796 n.8 (1950).
,28. See Paulsen, Migratory Divorce, 24 IND. L.J. 25 (1948). See also the
concurring opinion in Armstrong. v., Armstrong, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173, 4175-76
(U.S. April 9, 1956).
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due under the separate maintenance decree. Although finding that H
had established a bona fide domicile in Nevada and that the divorce
effectively terminated the marital relation, the New York court
granted W the relief she sought. The Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the action of the New York court.29
In his defense, H made two principal assertions: (1) since the bona
fides of H's domicile in Nevada had not been impeached, the Nevada
divorce effectively terminated the parties' marital status and there-
fore terminated any obligation of H incident to that status; and (2)
even conceding that the Nevada decree did not terminate H's duty of
support as a matter of full faith and credit, still, under prior New
York law a separate maintenance decree could not survive a foreign
ex parte divorce and thus W's action was precluded by local law.
Neither contention was successful.
Justice Douglas' treatment of the second point was summary:
The difficulty with that argument is that the highest court in
New York has held in this case that a support order can survive
divorce and that this one has survived....-'0
In answer to H's first contention, the Court pointed out that the termi-
nation of the marital relation did not necessarily relieve H of all the
obligations incidental to that relation. While recognizing the ever-
broadening scope of the full faith clause in the field of divorce, the
Court established a dual basis for according relief to W: (1) the in-
terest of New York, the state of W's domicile, in preventing W from
becoming a "public charge" as a result of the Nevada court's ex parte
termination of the marital status; and (2) the fact that M's separate
maintenance decree was an intangible "property interest" which could
not be affected by a court not having personal jurisdiction over W.
The result of this approach was to make the Nevada divorce decree
divisible; the decree effectively terminated the marital status, but
could not alter W's rights under the New York decree since the Nevada
court lacked jurisdiction over WV.
The Estin case has marked a significant development in its field.
No longer will the effect to be given ex parte divorces obtained at the
domicile of one of the parties depend solely upon the law of the divorc-
ing state. When W asserts a prior maintenance decree as in Estin
the survival of her decree will depend not on the law of the divorcing
state but on the law of the state rendering the maintenance decree.
Under the rubric of "jurisdiction" and "property rights" the consti-
tutional question has become one of due process as well as full faith
and credit. The result of Estin was thus to reaffirm the in rem-in
29. 3,4 U.S. 541 (1948).
30. Id. at 544. For developments in New York subsequent to Estin, see text
supported by notes 83-85 infra.
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personam distinction that had been established in Pennoyer V. Neff,31
some seventy years before.
In evaluating the implications of Estin several perplexing problems
are raised. The first is the inadequacy of the dual grounds offered by
the Court as justification for permitting W's maintenance decree to
survive the Nevada divorce. The asserted interest of the State of New
York in preventing W's becoming a "public charge" is appealing, but
hardly persuasive. In some instances a very real danger of eco-
nomic disaster might be present. Suppose, however, that W were
a wealthy heiress. Would her maintenance decree be terminated by an
ex parte divorce merely because there was no danger of her becoming
a public charge? Similarly, the "property interest" language of the
opinion is not compelling. It may be doubted whether clarification is
achieved by labeling a particular interest as "property." The inevitable
danger is jhat decisions will be based merely on a labeling process,
rather than on an actual analysis of the issues involved. Moreover, if
the property interest language is retained, it would seem that the
principle of Estin could not .be logically extended so as to permit a
wife's unadjudicated claim for support to survive a foreign ex parte
divorce. 2 To characterize such a claim as a property interest would
seem to distend the concept to such an extent that it would become
analytically meaningless.
A more plausible foundation for Estin can be achieved by less
tenuous reasoning. To deprive a wife of her right to support with-
out allowing her to have her day in court does not accord with funda-
mental principles of due process. Though in most instances she will re-
ceive mailed notice of the foreign divorce proceedings, it would seem
to be an intolerable burden for her to bear the expense of travel, wit-
nesses' and attorney's fees in order for her to defend the action in a
31. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Pennoyer case involved an action by plaintiff to
recover possession of a tract of land located in the state of Oregon. Defendant
claimed that he had acquired the premises by virtue of having executed upon ajudgment recovered against plaintiff in Oregon. The question concerned the
validity of that judgment. Plaintiff was not a resident of Oregon, was not per-
sonally served with process, and did not appear in the proceedings. Plaintiff was
served constructively under the provisions of an Oregon statute. Defendant in
the prior action, had not attached the property of plaintiff in Oregon until alterjudgment was rendered. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Oregon judgment was invalid, stating:[S]uch [constructive] service may answer in all actions which are sub-
stantially proceedings in rem. But where the entire object of the action is
to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants, that is,
where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service in this form upon
a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose.
Id, at 727. Although the case arose before the fourteenth amendment, it is com-
monly cited as having been based on the due process clause of that amendment.
For an excellent analysis of the problems raised by the case, see Sunderland,
The Problem of Jurisdiction, 4 TExAs L. REv. 429 (1926). An extended evaluation
of the implications of Pennoyer v. Neff is beyond the scope of this note.
32. But see Armstrong v. Armstrong, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173, 4175 (U.S.
April 9, 1956).
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distant forum. Moreover, since a court lacking personal jurisdiction
over H cannot validly grant alimony to W,33 why should a court with-
out personal jurisdiction of W be entitled to render a decree denying
alimony to her? In sum, she has never had a reasonable opportunity
to have her claim for support adjudicated on the nerits. Admittedly,
objection could be made that the same process of reasoning could be
used to determine that an ex parte divorce could not terminate the
marital relation. But there are intervening equities which dictate
recognition of the validity of such divorces to dissolve a marriage.
People do in fact remarry and beget children in reliance on such di-
vorces. When their validity is impeached, bigamous marriages and
illegitimate children are the inevitable result. No such dire conse-
quences follow when the husband procuring the divorce is merely com-
pelled to furnish support to his deserted spouse.
A further problem in the Estin case was raised in Justice Frank-
furter's dissent. Since there was considerable doubt as to the survival
of W's maintenance decree under prior New York decisions, Justice
Frankfurter pointed out that New York courts could not, consistently
with full faith and credit, hold that an ex parte divorce in New York
terminated W's right of action, but that a similar divorce procured
elsewhere would not preclude survival of her maintenance decree. It
does not seem, however, that the Justice's point is well taken. The full
faith clause, together with its legislative implementation, requires only
that F-2 courts give the same effect to an F-1 decree as a court in F-1
would give. F-2 is not prohibited by full faith and credit from treat-
ing foreign ex parte divorce decrees differently from domestic decrees
of a similar nature. It has been suggested that instead of the full faith
clause the Justice was referring to the privileges and immunities
clause." In view of the narrow scope which the latter clause has re-
ceived historically, however, it is doubtful whether it would be invoked
to prevent such discrimination against foreign divorce decrees. It
would seem, though, that if a party could prove that a particular state
consistently discriminated against foreign ex parte divorces a case
could be made that such a course of action would be a violation of the
equal protection clause.35
Possibly the most important problem raised by the Estin case con-
33. De la Montanya v. De ]a Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896);
Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575 (1873).
34. Carey & MacChesney, Dh,orce by the Consent of the Parties and Divisible
Diroree D crce", 43 ILL. L. REv. 608, 619-20 (1948). That such discrimination
would not violate any constitutional provision, see Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1951).
35. Thus, if such proof could be established, the situation would be one in
which one class of persons-those obtaining foreign ex parte divorces-are uni-
formly denied advantages given to another class of persons-those obtaining
domestic ex parte divorces. See generally, Yick Wo v. Hopldns, 118 U.S. 356(1886).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
cerned the current validity of the Thompson case, 0 and what the
Court's future attitude would be toward cases involving similar fac-
tual situations. Under Thompson, the survival of W's unadjudicated
'support rights depended solely on the law of the divorcing state; if
barred there, full faith required her action to be denied elsewhere.
Problems of jurisdiction, due process, and in personam rights were
not material. In Estin, Justice Douglas purported to distinguish
Thompson in a perplexing footnote:
The [Estin] case is unlike Tkompson v. Thompson... where the
wife by her conduct forfeited her right to alimony under the laws
of the State of the matrimonial domicile where her husband ob-
tained the divorce, and hence could not retain a judgement for
maintenance subsequently obtained in another jurisdiction."
In this one sentence are gathered at least four distinct aspects of
the Thompson case: (1) the wife's rights to alimony would not have
survived under the law of the state where the divorce was granted;
(2) the reason her right to alimony was terminated was that her own
misconduct forfeited that right; (3) the divorce decree was obtained
at the matrimonial domicile; and (4) W's action for maintenance was
first pursued subsequent to the divorce decree.
Until the recent decision in the Armstrong case, it was extremely
difficult to determine which one (or what combination) of these
grounds was to be considered the essential distinguishing feature and
which ones were to be treated as mere makeweights. On closer anal-
ysis, it will be seen that the second and third grounds were nothing
more than the "fault" and "matrimonial domicile" elements of Had-
dock, which were supposedly overruled by Williams I.," If these ele-
ments were to become predominant again, then the Haddock case not
only would not be overruled but would be the controlling authority.
That such an approach might be taken by the Court, however, seems
inconceivable in view of indications given in the Armstrong case that
Thompson v. Thompson is no longer valid.
In the Armstrong case, the parties were married in Ohio and subse-
quently moved to Florida, where they lived for many years. In 1950,
W left H and returned to Ohio. In October 1951, H procured a divorce
in Florida on constructive service to W, who did not appear in the
proceedings. The Florida decree made no award of alimony to W. In
February 1952, W sued in Ohio for a divorce and alimony. H ap-
peared and contested W's action. The lower court held that the di-
vorce was valid and entitled to full faith and credit, but that it did
not preclude W from obtaining alimony. The Ohio Supreme Court af-
36. 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
37. 334 U.S. 541, 546 n.4 (1948).
38. See text supported by notes 25-28 supra.
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firmed, ' basing its opinion upon an extension of the divisible divorce
doctrine enunciated in Estin and applied in prior Ohio cases.40
H's principal contention in Armstrong was that the Thompson case
was conclusive of W's right to relief.-' Further, he contended that
there must be some limit placed on the "divisible divorce" doctrine so
that at least the court of the matrimonial domicile should be able to de-
termine the previously unadjudicated support rights of a spouse who
had chosen to leave the parties' domicile. Thus, on the surface, it ap-
peared that Armstrong directly presented the question whether, under
the full faith clause, a wife's unadjudicated claim for support could
survive a valid ex parte divorce procured in another state. On closer
inspection of the case on oral argument, however, the majority of the
court concluded that the constitutional question did not have to be
met. Writing for the majority, Justice Minton based his opinion on
the view that the Florida court granting the divorce did not purport
to deny alimony to W. This, despite the fact that the Florida court,
after hearing H's evidence and granting the divorce, explicitly stated:
"It is, therefore, specifically decreed that no award of alimony be
made to the defendant ... 142 Accepting Justice Minton's interpre-
tation of the Florida divorce decree, the majority concluded that since
Florida had not purported to deny alimony to W, the Ohio court was
free to grant or deny her alimony without the restriction of the full
faith clause. Even under the majority opinion, one significant factor
emerged: A valid foreign ex parte divorce cannot, ex prop7io vigore,
preclude W from obtaining alimony. The divorce court must at least
purport to adjudicate W's right to alimony; otherwise, F-2 is free to
do as it pleases, so far as the question of full faith is concerned.
In the concurring opinion, Justice Black, with Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Douglas and Clark concurring, stated that the constitu-
tional question was squarely presented. These Justices interpreted
the Florida court's divorce decree as having purported to deny alimony
to W. The question, therefore, was whether the Ohio court was pre-
cluded by full faith and credit from awarding W alimony. These
Justices, basing their decision on an extension of the logic of Estin,
felt that the Ohio court was not so precluded. Thus, the fact that W
in Armstrong had not reduced to judgment her claim for support
prior to the divorce (as W had done in Estin) was considered as not a
39. 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954).
40. Slapp v. Slapp, 143 Ohio St. 105, 54 N.E.2d 153 (1944); Cox v. Cox,
19 Ohio St. 502 (1869).
41. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-13, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 24 U.S.L. WEEK
4173 (U.S. April 9, 1956).
42. Id. at Ca.
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"meaningful distinction."'' 3 The ultimate foundation for the concur-
ring opinion, however, was an old stand-by:
It has been the constitutional rule in this country at least since
Pennoyer v. Neff . . . that nonresidents cannot be subjected to
personal judgments without such [personal] service or appear-
ance. We held in Estin v. Estin ... that an alimony judgment
was this kind of "personal judgment. '44
In answer to H's contention that the Armstrong case was controlled
by the Thompson case, Justice Black pointed out that Thompson
was decided long before the Williams cases, the Estin case, and other
developments in the field.45 Moreover, it was recognized that no con-
tention for a divisible divorce doctrine had been made in Thompson,
since W's theory there was based solely on the continued existence of
the marital relation. The concurring opinion concluded that in any
event, to the extent that the Thompson case was inconsistent with
Pennoyer v. Neff and the Estin case, it should no longer be considered
authoritative.
While the theory upon which the majority opinion in Armstrong
skirted the constitutional issue seems highly questionable, it is possi-
ble that there was, in fact, no question of full faith presented. Though
not discussed in the majority or concurring opinions, nor apparently
argued by counsel, there was no showing that under Florida taw W's
right to alimony would have been barred by H's ex parte divorce. In
fact, the Florida Supreme Court has recently held that a wife's action
for alimony in Florida is not barred by a valid foreign ex parte di-
vorce."" If it had been shown that H's Florida divorce would not have
precluded W's subsequent action for alimony in Florida, then seem-
ingly no full faith question would have been present, since the Ohio
court was only required by full faith to give the same effect to the
Florida divorce decree as would have been given by the Florida
courts.
4 7
The Armstrong case is not definite authority that a court in F-2 is
free, so far as full faith is concerned, to grant or deny alimony to W
after a valid ex parte divorce in F-1. At least four Justices, however,
have revealed their positions. To these four, the divisible divorce
doctrine of Estin also applies when a wife's support rights have not
been adjudicated prior to the divorce. Also, by their calculations,
the Thompson case is no longer a case to be seriously reckoned
43. 24 U.S.L. WEEK at 4175.
44. Ibid.
45. In addition to the Williams and Estin cases, see, e.g., May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953) ; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
46. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866
(1950). Of course, the further question is whether Florida would be compelled
to give the same effect to domestic ex parte divorce decrees. See discussion in
text supported by notes 34-35 supra.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
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with. It seems quite likely that this position will be accepted in the
future by a majority of the Court, when the question is squarely pre-
sented for decision.
If the extension of the Estin case indicated by the concurring opin-
ion in Armstrong is accepted, a further problem arises. Many state
cases have held that TV is precluded from obtaining alimony or sup-
port subsequent to H's valid ex parte divorce because of the lack of
an v available remedy under local law, or for various other considera-
tions of "public policy," rather than full faith and credit.48 Since the
basis for Estin (and presumably for any extension of Estin) is the
lack of jurisdiction of the divorcing state to adjudicate TV's support
rights without in personam jurisdiction, could TV validly argue that
due process would prevent a court in F-2 from denying her claim for
alimony because of any of these reasons established under local law?
Further, suppose TV were able to secure service of process on H only
in F-1, the state where the divorce decree was granted. Could W suc-
cessfully contend that under the principles of Pennoyer 'v. Neff a per-
sonal judgment procured against a nonresident, nonappearing de-
fendant is wanting in due process and is invalid for any purpose, even
in the state where rendered?',
While these consequences might appear to be the ultimate result of
importing the in rem-in personam doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff into
the area of alimony claims, such a result would appear to unduly ex-
tend the divisible divorce concept. The fact that the court in the di-
vorcing state could not affect TV's support rights without personal jur-
isdiction does not necessarily mean that F-2 cannot adopt local rules
of law that would bar TV's action. Obviously, of course, TV could be
denied relief because of defenses to the merits of her action (her own
misconduct, or lack of need, for example) or because of other equita-
ble defenses, e.g., estoppel or laches. Similarly, there would seem to
be no constitutional limitation to prevent F-2 from establishing local
rules or statutes which would permit an action for alimony or support
only during the continued existence of the marital relation. The only
restriction on F-2, therefore, would be that it could not deny TV's ac-
tion because of full faith and credit. Likewise, if TV were forced to
bring her action for alimony in F-1 it would appear that she could be
denied relief under the local law of that state. To the extent, there-
fore, that states are permitted freedom in adopting local rules of law
which either grant or deny alimony after a valid ex parte divorce, the
theory of Pennoyer, that personal judgments based only upon con-
48. See, .q., Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal. App. 2d 233, 160 P.2d 923 (1945);
Peff v. Peff, 2 N.J. 513, 67 A.2d 161 (1949); Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d
518 (1955).
49. See the discussion of Pennoyer v. Neff in note 31 supra.
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stiuctive service are totally ineffectual, will not be applicable in its
entirety- in the field of interstate divorce.
Regardless of whether the divisible divorce principles of the con-
curring opinion in the Armstrong case are accepted in future deci-
sions, many problems remain to be solved before the divisible divorce
doctrine becomes a complete pattern of law. At least one of them de-
serves special mention. In many ex parte divorces the wife is the
party who procures the divorce. Aside from the question of possible
estoppel, ° should the fact that the wife obtained the divorce be con-
stitutionally material insofar as her right subsequently to obtain ali-
mony is concerned?
- In general, so far as the problem of choice of laws has been con-
sidered, 51 it is recognized that whether W can obtain alimony or sup-
port following an ex parte divorce decree depends upon the law of her
domicile at the time of the divorce.52 For example, under Pennsyl-
vania law W cannot obtain alimony after the marital relation is ter-
minated. Thus, if W is domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time her hus-
band procures a valid divorce in Nevada, she would be barred from
subsequently obtaining alimony under Pennsylvania law. 3 Nor could
she migrate to 4 state like Ohio, where a wife may procure alimony
subsequent to such a divorce,54 and assert that she should be able to ob-
tain relief under Ohio law.
This choice of laws factor is basic in the determination of the ques-
tion of the survival of W's support rights after she obtains the di-
vorce. Of course, if by the law of the state where W obtained the di-
vorce her support rights were not terminated by the divorce, then she
would not be barred from obtaining alimony or support in F-2 either
by the full faith clause or by the above choice of laws rule. However,
if W obtains a divorce in a state where her support rights did not sur-
vive a divorce, it would seem that she would not be able later to obtain
alimony in another state. A serious question, however, is whether she
would be barred as a matter of full faith and credit5 or merely as a
matter of the proper application of a choice of laws rule. If the "ju-
risdictional" approach suggested by Estin and Armstrong is followed,
the divorcing state would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate W's ali-
mony rights, absent personal jurisdiction of H. Thus, any attempt by
the court in the divorcing state to determine W's support rights would
.50. See text supported by note 77 infra.
51. Many courts apparently apply forum law without considering the question.
See, e.g., Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
52. Dhinon v. Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 254 P.2d 528 (1953); Morris, Divisible
Divorce, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1951).
53. Commonwealth v. Petrosky, 168 Pa. Super. 232, 77 A.2d 647 (1951).
54. 'Slapp v. Slapp, 143 Ohio St. 105, 54 N.E.2d 153 (1944).
55. Judge Traynor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Dimon v.
Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 540, 254 P.2d 528, 541 (1953), expressed the opinion that
W would be precluded by full faith and credit.
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be a nullity. Since the F-1 court lacked jurisdiction to award her
support, it would seem that full faith would not preclude F-2 from
awarding her support, even though she would have been barred ac-
cording to the law of F-1.51 Concededly, W would be barred if F-2
applied the choice of laws rule previously suggested57 But suppose
F-2 chose instead to hold that W's right to support was governed by
its law rather than the law of W's domicile at the time of the divorce.
Would F-2 be free to so choose? While it was formerly recognized by
the Supreme Court that an erroneous application of a choice of laws
rule did not raise a constitutional question,5" more recent decisions in-
dicate that the Court is severely limiting the traditional freedom of
the states in the area of choice of laws. '
So far has the concept of "divisible divorce" progressed. Since the
doctrine is relatively new and still in the process of development, re-
sults will be obtained which appear at first glance to be anomalous.
Indeed, the doctrine would not meet the absolutist's ideal. Many areas
remain unexplored. That the doctrine has developed at all, however, is
a tribute to a Court which is beginning to move away from the tradi-
tionally rigid, formalistic approach which has too often in the past
restricted the decisions in the area of conflicts of law to a purely mech-
anistic application of certain "established" first principles. Within
the constitutional framework, there is no inherent limitation in the
area of interstate divorce to prevent a court from adopting any set of
rules which it feels best serves the interest of justice.
To conclude that a wife's support rights subsequent to an ex parte
divorce should not be barred by full faith and credit, however, is to
answer only part of her problem. Certainly, a more immediate and
practical problem for her is to discover a remedy under the law of the
state in which she seeks relief. To this problem the remainder of this
note will be devoted.1 "
II
Some preliminary observations should be made before examining
local law relative to the survival of a wife's support action after a for-
eign ex parte divorce. Of course, if the Supreme Court should rule
that full faith requires that a valid foreign divorce terminate W's
0,6. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4173, 4175 (U.S. April 9,1956).
57, See text supported by note 52 spra.
58. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
59. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The Supreme Court's approach to the problem
of requiring uniformity in the application of state choice of laws rules has been
on a two-fold basis: due process and full faith and credit. For a comprehensive
discussion of the problem, see Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the
Choice of Laws, 1939 WASH. U.L.Q. 27.
60. This discussion will consider only the question of W's support rights
following a valid ex parte divorce. Problems regarding her rights of inheritance
and rights in specific property are beyond the scope of this treatment.
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right to obtain alimony, then local law to the contrary would no longer
be controlling. Local law will be important, therefore, only so long
as the Court does not so interpret the full faith requirement. Even a
Supreme Court ruling as indicated by the Armstrong case that under
the divisible divorce doctrine W's right of action is not barred by
full faith would not fully answer her problem. A confusing variety
of local rules and statutes may still bar her recovery.
In analyzing the state cases it is important at the outset to place
them in their proper context. Several factors indicate that many of
these cases are of extremely doubtful validity at the present time.
The first is the almost complete renovation which has taken place in
the field of conflict of laws in recent times. Many of the state cases
were decided prior to the Williams cases, and involved divorces that
were recognized only under principles of comity and public policy.
Whether similar decisions would be reached in these cases under the
mandatory full faith recognition policy established by Williams I is at
least questionable. Further, the divisible divorce concept of the Estin
and Armstrong cases, while not commanding that a state permit W's
action for support, may well have established a rationale which will
stimulate re-evaluation of many prior state cases. Finally, the judi-
cial opinions on the state court level, and the contentions of counsel
as revealed in the opinions, are something less than noteworthy.01 The
temptation to court and counsel to indulge in vague and fanciful gen-
eralities in this area seems irresistible. The enterprising practitioner
should not be dismayed, therefore, if he finds a leading case in his
jurisdiction which appears to bar his client's action.
A variety of reasons have been advanced in many state cases for de-
nying W alimony after H has procured a valid ex parte divorce in an-
other state. Some decisions, of course, have been rested upon the full
faith clause. 62 To the extent that the concurring opinion in Arm-
strong is indicative of the future attitude of the remainder of the
Court, these cases will be overturned. In addition, W has often been
denied relief because she sought to recover under a local statute which
the court interpreted as requiring the existence of the marital relation
as a prerequisite to recovery. G3 Thus, in a leading New Jersey case,
Peff v. Peff,64 after H obtained a Nevada divorce W sought relief un-
der a New Jersey statute whose provisions are typical:
61. A typical example is Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), a verita-
ble masterpiece of confusion.
62. See, e.g., Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So. 2d 781 (1951); Common-
wealth v. Petrosky, 168 Pa. Super. 232, 77 A.2d 647 (1951).
63. Meredith v. Meredith, 204 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1953), overruled by Hopson
v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass. 603, 88
N.E.2d 143 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950); Peff v. Peff, 2 N.J. 513,
67 A.2d 161 (1949); Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d 518 (1955).
64. 2 N.J. 513, 67 A.2d 161 (1949).
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If a husband, without justifiable cause, shall abandon his wife
or separate himself from her and refuse or neglect to maintain
and provide for her, the court may order suitable support and
maintenance to be paid and provided by the husband for the
wife. .... I
The court found that the divorce had effectively terminated the
marital relation and consequently precluded W's action, since the
statute required the continued existence of the marital relation in
order for her to recover. An ex-wife, therefore, could not qualify as
a "wife" within the meaning of the statute.
Other courts, when confronted by similar statutes, have used two
different approaches to avoid an impasse such as the Peff case. Under
one view, the term "wife" in the statute refers only to the person, not
to the relation. An ex-wife has been granted relief under such an in-
terpretation.3 Another approach is to consider that an ex-wife may
be a "wife" for the purpose of bringing her action for alimony6 7 It
would seem that both of these approaches are rather obvious attempts
at judicial legislation. When read in context, there is little doubt that
the statutes contemplate the existence of the marital relation as a pre-
requisite to relief. If it is felt that TV should be allowed to recover in
these situations, there are less blatant methods of achieving that re-
sult. Primarily, of course, attempt should be made to amend the stat-
ute. Failing this, it is possible that W may proceed in an independent
action for alimony, relying on the inherent power of a court of equity
to grant her relief, rather than on statutory authorization.
The Peff case is further illustrative of the failure of W to seek the
proper remedy under local law. Instead of seeking relief as a "wife"
under the above statute, she might well have proceeded under a New
Jersey statute providing that a court may order alimony or mainte-
nance either pending or after a divorce decree, whether obtained in
New Jersey or elsewhere."' This statute appears to be a definite legis-
lative recognition of the divisible divorce doctrine and could seemingly
have offered TV a chance to litigate her claim on the merits.70 At least
.% N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:50-39 (1939).
66. Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869).
67. See, e.g., Melnyk v. Melnyk, 49 Ohio App. 22, 107 N.E.2d 549 (C.P. 1952).
68. This approach was successful in an important recent case in the District
of Ctlumbia. Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955). On the strength
of this case attempts no doubt will be made in the future to contend for the
inherent power of a court of equity to award alimony, especially when the
particular claim does not meet the conditions of a local statute.
69, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1952). For similar statutes, see ILL. REV.
STAT, C. 40, § 21 (1955); KAN. GEN. STATS. § 60-1518 (1949) MAss. ANN. LAWS
c. 208 § .'4 (1955); N.Y. CiV. PRAC. ACT § 1170-b; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1284 (1937).
70. The PeIf case is not unique in presenting a situation in which W apparently
sought relief under the wrong local statute. See also Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 233, 160 P.2d 923 (1945); Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E2d 143
(1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950).
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it seems that W should have tried to join the two causes of action, pro-
ceeding on the theory that either the divorce was invalid, or, even if
valid, that she should still be entitled to alimony.
In addition to utilizing a statutory basis for denying relief to W,
several states have relied on long-established common-law grounds
for denying relief. Thus, it is frequently asserted that alimony may
be granted only as an incident to a divorce proceeding7 1 Since by
hypothesis H's valid foreign divorce precludes W from subsequently
maintaining a divorce action,'2 her action for alimony also fails. This
approach is subject to attack in two respects. First, there is no nec-
essary limitation, either historical or rational, to prevent the allow-
ance of alimony unconnected with a divorce action. 3 Few proceedings
savor more of broad, equitable principles than actions for alimony.
If alimony is to be allowed only as an incident to a divorce action, it
should be recognized as a rule of choice rather than of necessity. Sec-
ond, even though, as a matter of expediency, a court might choose to
require W to seek alimony at the time of a divorce in an action
wherein both parties were present, quite different considerations ap-
ply to ex parte divorces. It is impossible for W to present her claim
for alimony in a divorce action of which she was totally unaware, and
practically so in one in which she had no reasonable opportunity to
appear.
The well-worn term "jurisdiction" has also been used as a basis for
denying relief to W in some cases. Thus, it is asserted that since the
marital relation has been terminated in F-1, the F-2 court lacks juris-
diction to decide W's alimony claim.7 4 The complete pliability of the
jurisdictional approach is exemplified by several other decisions in
which courts concluded that the failure of jurisdiction was in the F-1
court (wherein personal service upon W was lacking) rather than in
F-2.75 The latter view, recognizing the distinction between in per-
sonam and in rem rights is, of course, the theory of the Estin and
Armstrong cases, and may well be the approach of future cases.
71. Shaw v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 722, 61 N.W. 368 (1894) ; Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472,
114 A.2d 518 (1955).
72. A few states, however, provide that one of the causes for which a spouse
can maintain a divorce action is that his or her spouse obtained a divorce out-
side the state. FIA. STATs. ANN. § 65.04 (8) (1943); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.86
(1937). As an incident of this divorce action W may obtain alimony. See Van
Inwagen v. Van Inwagen, 86 Mich. 333, 49 N.W. 154 (1891). The operation of
these statutes would seem to be severely restricted as a result of the Williams
cases.
73. Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
74. Chirgwin v. Chirgwin, 26 Cal. App. 2d 506, 79 P.2d 772 (1938); Staub v.
Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 Atl. 605 (1936).
1 75. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn. 24, 4 N.W.2d 785 (1942); Melnyk v.
Melnik, 49 Ohio App. 22, 107 N.E.2d 549. (C.P. 1952) ; West v. West, 114 Okla.
g79, 246 Pac. 599 (1926).
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Further complications are added when W is the party procuring
the divorce. In this situation it is also frequently contended"8 that W
"voluntarily" chose to obtain the divorce, and having done so, is es-
topped from later asserting a claim for alimony.77 Again, relief has
been denied on the theory that W has "waived" her right to alimony
by obtaining the ex parte divorce. ,
Thus, in many states, the outlook for the alimony-seeking ex-wife
is dismal. In others, however, her prospects are considerably brighter.
Recently, many courts have begun to realize that an action for alimony
subsequent to a divorce is not a conceptual impossibility.79 Where the
wife is afforded relief, the result is generally based on the jurisdic-
tional, in rem-in personam approach suggested in Estin and Arm-
strong.", The same approach may be used, of course, to allow W ali-
mony after she herself has procured the divorce.*1
The eventual solution to this phase of the problem, however, may
well rest with state legislatures. A few states have enacted statutes
expressly allowing an ex-wife to obtain alimony from her former
spouse.- The post-Estin. developments in New York are particularly
revealing. The New York courts, limiting Estin to its precise facts,
held that an ex-wife could not obtain alimony subsequent to a valid
foreign divorce unless, prior to the divorce, she had obtained a judg-
ment for support. 3 Then, in 1953, the state legislature, on the rec-
. of course, some of the reasons for denying W relief when H procures the
the divorce (.g., alimony is only allowable as an incident of divorce, or lack ofjurisdiction) could also be used to deny IW relief when she obtained the divorce.
,7. Doeksen v. Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489, 210 N.W. 545 (1926); Staub v. Staub,
170 Md. 202, 183 Ati. 605 (1936); Hunter v. Hunter, 24 N.Y.S.2d '76 (Sup. Ct.
1940). The estoppel rationale is based on the theory that W should not be allowed
to attack a judgment (the divorce decree) which she herself procured. But it is
clear that under the divisible divorce approach, W would not be impeaching the
validity of the divorce in any respect in seeking to obtain alimony. Similarly, the
contenion that W voluntarily chose the forum and thus should not be heard to
complain fails in the frequently occurring situation in which H's whereabouts are
unknown and W has no real choice as to where to bring the action.
78. Se, e.g., Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 254 P.2d 528 (1953). The
"waiver" theory is a unique one. In the usual case, W has to choose between
retaining her rights to support under a disagreeable marital relation and ob-
tainig a divorce with the consequent loss of support. Neither of the two alterna-
tives offeis much of a choice to 1Y. Nevertheless, the theory is that she has elected
to obtain the divorce and thus has waived her right to support.
79. Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Gray v. Gray, 61 F.
Supp. 3167 (E.D. Mich. 1945); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950);
Taylor v. Taylor, 242 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1951); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn.
24, 4 N.W.2d 785 (1942); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't
1955).
80. See text supported by notes 31, 44 supra.
81. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 54 Ohio App. 239, 6 N.E.2d 1005 (1936); West
v. West, 114 Okla. 279, 246 Pac. 599 (1926); Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 24
N.W.2d :327 (1946).
82, See statutes cited in note 69 supra.
83. Harris v. Harris, 279 App. Div. 542, 110 N.Y.S.2d 824 (4th Dep't 1952);
Adler v. Adler, 192 Misc. 953, 81 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948).
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ommendation of the New York Law Revision Commission, adopted
the following statute:
In an action for divorce, separation or annulment.., where the
court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the
court that a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring the mar-
riage a nullity had previously been granted to the husband in an
action in which jurisdiction over the person of the wife was not
obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render ... such judgment
as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife.84
While the statute was less than perfect from a standpoint of drafts-
manship, its import was clear. The statute was sustained against an
asserted violation of due process in a recent case, Vanderbilt v. Van-
derbilt.85 After reviewing the divisible divorce doctrine of the Estin
case, and its subsequent restriction in New York, the court concluded
that the statute was nothing more than a permissible legislative ex-
tension of the judicial concept that a divorce based only upon con-
structive service is divisible.
That legislative action in many states may be needed if W is to be
accorded relief seems certain in view of two factors. As aforemen-
tioned, courts have often precluded W's action because she failed to
qualify as a "wife" under the local statute.86 Since the statutory pro-
vision is frequently considered the sole remedy, to the exclusion of
equitable relief,17 it would seem that only legislative action would ac-
cord W relief. Similarly, judicial inertia resulting from the long-es-
tablished rule in some states that an action for alimony can be main-
tained only as an incident to a divorce is unlikely to be shaken with-
out definite legislative intervehtion. A simple, clear-cut expression of
legislative policy should effectively obviate any judicial doubt on the
subject.
CONCLUSION
Under the state of the law prior to the Williams cases a spouse
against whom a divorce proceeding was brought could in many cases
frustrate the other spouse's divorce action if he was sufficiently mobile
to be able to evade service of process and to establish domicile else-
where. The focus was reversed in the Williams cases, which enabled
the divorce-seeking spouse to terminate effectively the marital relation
provided he could afford the expense of a relatively short stay in Ne-
vada or Florida. The constitutional protection afforded such divorces
opened wide the avenue of escape for husbands seeking to relieve
themselves of burdensome marital obligations.
84. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1170-b.
85. 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1955).
86. See text supported by notes 65, 70 supra.
87. Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d 518 (1955). Contra, Hopson v. Hopson,
221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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NOTES
In order to relieve such a situation, the doctrine of divisible divorce
was formulated. It is obviously an attempted compromise. As such,
it has met with criticism from both extremes. It is not, of course, a
cure-all. Where W is barred from obtaining relief under local law,
the fact that the divorce decree is divisible wvill offer little solace. In
this area legislative action may be needed to supplement the divisible
divorce concept.- Further, the doctrine itself may create difficulties
by postponing indefinitely the time at which the validity of the di-
vorce will be determined.9 But these problems are not insurmounta-
ble; further development of the doctrine, therefore, is both to be ex-
pected and desired.
EDWARD BEIMFOHR
88. See text supported by notes 85-87 supra.
89. Thus, since IF could obtain the relief she seeks without attacking the
divorce, the validity of the divorce might not be determined until H's death,
when rival claimants might attempt to share as a "wife" in H's estate. To avoid
this result, it is possible to adopt a rule requiring W to attack the divorce within
a specified period of time, or at the time she seeks alimony. Failing to do so,
she could be considered to be precluded from later attacking the divorce. Query,
however, whether this approach could prevent children of the marriage or other
interested parties from later impeaching the validity of the divorce. See Note,
1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 94.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/4
